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HOW MUCH REDISTRIBUTION
DO WELFARE STATES






Government policies in all OECD countries affect
the distribution of household income. They do so
through a range of programmes but most directly
through the cash transfers paid to households and the
direct taxes and social security contributions collect-
ed from them. However, different welfare states may
pursue a variety of social objectives, with the balance
and priority given to each of them varying across
both countries and between programmes. A critical
issue that all OECD governments confront – particu-
larly when considering policy reforms – is whether
the redistributive and other policy objectives of soci-
ety could be more effectively or efficiently achieved
through a different mix or design of policies.
A recently published OECD study on trends and dri-
ving forces of household income distribution during
the past 20 years reports a moderate but significant and
widespread increase of income inequality and relative
poverty in the OECD region (OECD 2008).1 This
study also provides analyses of the impact of taxes and
transfers on the distribution of incomes. In the follow-
ing, the key findings of these analyses are summarised.
An accounting framework for household income
Underlying all comparisons of welfare state out-
comes is a framework for analysing the process of
income distribution and redistribution (Esping-
Andersen 1990). The standard approach set out in
Table 1 is an accounting framework that allows dif-
ferent components of income to be related to each
other and suitable aggregates to be derived. This
framework can be used to construct a number of
measures of the redistributive impact of social secu-
rity and taxation policies.In particular,the degree of
redistribution effected by taxes or social transfers
can be calculated by comparing inequality and
poverty indicators at different stages in the process
outlined. For example, the impact of cash transfers
can be evaluated by comparing indicators on the
basis of market income (Stage 2) and on the basis of
gross income (Stage 3),while the effects of taxes can
be calculated by comparing measures of gross and
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disposable incomes (Stage 4). As noted by Ringen
(1987),this standard approach provides a simple but
ingenious and flexible model. It remains, however,
both linear and static.
Targeting and progressivity: how do social pro-
grammes and taxes affect income distribution?
When considering the redistributive impact of alter-
native systems of social protection it is important to
note that their design features differ in important
respects.Two of the most important features relate to
the way benefits are funded – i.e.,the different ways in
which programmes are financed – and structured –
i.e., the relationship between benefits re-ceived and
the past or current income of beneficiaries. Using
these criteria, the social welfare systems of OECD
countries are often characterised as either “Bis-
marckian” or “Beveridgean” (Werding 2003). In the
first,social programmes are based on social insurance
principles, with earnings-related benefits, entitlement
based on contribution records and funding through
employer and employee social security contributions.
In the second, policies are generally characterised by
universal provision, with entitlement based on resi-
dence and in some cases need, and with benefits that
are flat-rate and financed through general taxation.
Bismarckian-type welfare states are sometimes
characterised as giving priority to the “piggy-bank”
objective – i.e., providing income maintenance in
the face of adverse risks (unemployment, disability,
sickness) or to redistribute across the lifecycle –
while Beveridgean-type welfare states give priority
to the “Robin Hood” objective (see Barr 2001). For
instance, Falkingham and Harding (1996) estimated
that in Australia, 38 percent of lifetime benefits re-
ceived by individuals, on average, were financed
through taxes they paid at another stage in their
lifecycle, and the remaining 62 percent of lifetime
benefits involved redistribution between rich and
poor; in the United Kingdom these shares were
reversed,with 38 percent of lifetime benefits involv-
ing redistribution between individuals and 62 per-
cent involving redistribution over different phases
of the lifecycle.
The differing designs of social programmes influence
the distribution of household incomes in different
ways.In assessing these impacts it is important to dis-
tinguish between targeting, progressivity, and redis-
tribution.
• Targeting is a means for determining either eligi-
bility for benefits or the level of entitlements for
those eligible. In a sense, all benefit systems –
apart from a universal “basic income” scheme –
are targeted to specific categories of people, such
as the unemployed, people with disabilities or
those over retirement age.
• Progressivity refers to the profile of benefits
when compared to market or disposable incomes
– how large a share of benefits is received by dif-
ferent income groups – e.g., do the poor receive
more than the rich from the transfer system?
• Finally, redistribution refers to the outcomes of
different tax and benefit systems – how much
does the benefit system actually change the distri-
bution of household income?
The main prerequisites for (static) redistribution to
occur are that the distribution of cash transfers and
that of household taxation be more progressive than
the distribution of market income.Overall,the degree
of redistribution achieved by the tax-benefit system
thus reflects both the progressivity of taxes and bene-
fits and their size,i.e.,the level of spending and of rev-
enue collected (Barr 1992).2The progressivity of ben-
efits is determined by whether the system is means-
tested (and how),flat-rate or earnings-related (and to
what degree).By definition,in a means-tested system,
benefits provided to the poorest are greater than the
average benefits paid. Conversely, a universal, flat-
rate system provides benefits that are of equal value
to all recipients, while under an earnings-related sys-
tem average benefits are greater than minimum ben-
efits. It follows that, for a given amount of spending,
benefits paid to those with fewer economic resources
will be greater under a means-tested system than
under a universal benefit system, which in turn will
provide more generous payments to the poor than an
earnings-related system. On the other hand, these
characteristics of welfare systems are likely to impact
on the overall size of spending,as the middle class will
be more supportive of welfare programmes when
benefits are universally provided (Korpi and Palme
1998). The critical question, therefore, relates to the
impact of different programme designs or distribu-
tional profiles when levels of spending and taxes dif-
fer across countries.
2 Other influences include the incidence of unemployment by
income class and differences in life expectancy and disability by
income;the take-up of benefits (low take-up reduces effective pro-
gressivity) and the coverage of the social security system – Mexico
and Turkey have the least redistributive social security systems in
the OECD, with the main explanation for this being their lower
level of coverage of the population.Size and concentration of public
cash transfers and household
taxes
These levels differ indeed signifi-
cantly across OECD countries.
Table 2 shows shares of public
cash transfers (column A) and of
household taxes (column C) in
household disposable income.
Cash benefits are lowest in Korea
and Mexico,at  3 percent and 6 per-
cent of household disposable in-
come,respectively,and in the Unit-
ed States where they account for
less than 10 percent of household
income.They are below the OECD
average of 22 percent, also in the
other English-speaking countries,
as well as in Finland,3 Japan, the
Netherlands, Switzerland, Turkey
and the United Kingdom; but they
exceed 30 percent of household
income in Austria,Belgium,France,
Hungary, Luxembourg, Poland and
Sweden.4 Since the mid-1990s,
benefit shares have fallen in two
thirds of countries,most strongly in
Finland and Sweden, following the
recovery from the deep recession
in the early 1990s, but also in
Ireland, due to strong rates of eco-
nomic growth. On the other hand,
cash benefits have grown in signifi-
cance in Germany and,particularly,
in Japan and Turkey (OECD 2008).
Measured household taxes also
vary widely.They are low in Korea
but account for more than 40 per-
cent of household disposable
income in Sweden and more than 50 percent in
Denmark and Iceland.The share of household taxes –
as measured in household surveys – has decreased on
average by about 1 percentage point since the middle
of the 1990s, matching the decline recorded on the
transfer side, with larger declines in the Netherlands,
Canada, Germany, Ireland and Finland.
Column B of Table 2 compares OECD countries in
terms of how cash benefits are distributed across
income groups.The measure shown is the concentra-
tion coefficient (with individuals ranked by their dis-
posable income). The concentration coefficient of
benefits can be negative (in the case where poorer
income groups receive a higher share of transfers
than their share of disposable income) – with lower
and more negative values implying greater progres-
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3 The apparently low level of public cash benefits in Finland reflects
the fact that mandatory occupational pensions are counted as a pri-
vate transfer rather than as government cash transfers.
4 Of course, cash benefits are much more significant for the popu-
lation of retirement age, amounting to almost 70 percent of their
incomes on OECD average, while they constitute some 16 percent
of household incomes of working-age persons. This difference is
particularly stark in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Iceland,
Italy, Luxembourg and Sweden (OECD 2008).
Table 2 
Size and concentration of cashbenefits and household taxes, mid-2000s

















(A) (B) (C) (D)
Australia 14 -0,400 23 0,533
Austria 37 0,157 33 0,381
Belgium 30 –0,120 38 0,398
Canada 14 –0,152 26 0,492
Czech Republic 24 –0,154 22 0,471
Denmark 26 –0,316 53 0,349
Finland 14 –0,219 30 0,428
France 33 0,136 26 0,374
Germany 28 0,013 36 0,468
Greece
a) 23 0,115 – –
Hungary
a) 35 –0,016 – –
Iceland 19 –0,041 53 0,267
Ireland 18 –0,214 19 0,570
Italy 29 0,135 30 0,546
Japan 20 0,010 20 0,378
Korea 3 –0,029 8 0,378
Luxembourg 31 0,085 24 0,420
Mexico
a) 6 0,373 – –
Netherlands 17 –0,198 25 0,471
New Zealand 13 –0,345 29 0,498
Norway 22 –0,183 33 0,376
Poland
1 36 0,185 28 0,379
Portugal
1 26 0,247 – –
Slovak Republic 26 –0,056 20 0,422
Spain
a) 21 0,063 – –
Sweden 33 –0,145 43 0,337
Switzerland 16 –0,170 36 0,223
Turkey
a) 17 0,347 – –
United Kingdom 15 –0,275 24 0,533
United States 9 –0,089 26 0,586
OECD
b) 22 –0,085 29 0,428
a) Data on public cash benefits are reported net of taxes (i.e., household
taxes not separately identified). –
b) Average of the 25 OECD countries
with data on both gross public cash transfers and household taxes (i.e., all 30
OECD countries except Greece, Hungary, Mexico, Spain andTurkey).
Source: OECD (2008).CESifo DICE Report 3/2009 37
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sivity.The distribution of cash benefits for the entire
population is most progressive, by a wide margin, in
Australia, followed by New Zealand, Denmark, the
United Kingdom, Finland and Ireland, while it is
least progressive in Mexico, Turkey, Portugal and
Poland.
Column D of Table 2 shows the distribution of
household taxes (income taxes and employee social
security contributions). Because taxes are deducted
from household incomes, higher values of the con-
centration coefficient imply a more progressive dis-
tribution of household taxes. Overall, there is less
variation in the progressivity of taxes across coun-
tries than in the case of transfers.The distribution of
taxation tends to be most progressive in the English-
speaking countries together with Italy, followed by
the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Germany.
Taxes tend to be least progressive in the Nordic
countries, France and Switzerland.5
How much redistribution is achieved through 
government cash benefits and household taxes?
The most direct way to illustrate the effect of public
cash transfers and household taxes on the distribution
of household disposable income is to compare the
measures of income inequality and poverty computed
over the various income concepts described in Table 1.
While such comparisons will reflect differences in both
size and structure of welfare pro-
grammes and tax systems across
countries, they provide a conve-
nient summary measure that is use-
ful for comparing countries and
assessing changes over time.
In terms of disposable income,
there are large and persistent
differences in the overall extent of
inequality and relative poverty
(Figure 1), as measured by the
Gini coefficient of income in-
equality (bars) and the share of
persons living in households
below half the median income
(dots). These cross-country pat-
terns are fairly robust with regard
to alternative inequality indices and poverty thresh-
olds (OECD 2008). Relative poverty rates are
always the lowest in Denmark and Sweden and
always the highest in Mexico and Turkey, but differ-
ences remain large when excluding from the analysis
countries at both ends of the league table of OECD
countries. Inequality and poverty are below-average
in all Nordic and several Continental European
countries, and above-average in Poland, the United
States and several Southern European countries.
When calculated on the basis of market income, i.e.,
prior to taking into account household taxes and
cash transfers, inequality and poverty measures are
always higher,implying that tax and benefits systems
reduce overall inequality and poverty in all coun-
tries.6 The extent of such reduction differs, however,
largely across countries.Figure 2 shows estimates for
the “effectiveness” of the cash benefits and taxes in
reducing income inequality and poverty: the per-
centage reduction in Gini coefficients (Panel A) and
in poverty rates (Panel B) when moving from mar-
ket income to disposable income. These reduction
rates are calculated separately for the entire popula-
tion and the population of working age (18–65).
On average, across the 25 OECD countries covered,
the tax and transfer systems lower income inequality
by around one-third overall and by around a quarter
for the working-age population. Reduction rates are
highest in Belgium, Denmark and Sweden (around
5 The progressivity of the tax system also depends on the level of
inequality of taxable income, and the effective progressivity of a
given tax schedule will be greater in a country with a more unequal
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LEVELS OF INCOME INEQUALITY AND POVERTY IN OECD COUNTRIES
mid-2000s
Note: Countries are ranked in increasing order of the Gini coefficient of income inequality. Data 
refer to the distribution of household disposable income in cash across people, with each person 





6 Note that this does not necessarily hold for particular sub-groups
of the population in some countries. Child poverty rates in Japan
are, for instance, higher after accounting for net transfers (OECD
2008).45 percent for the entire population and 36–38 per-
cent for the working-age population) and lowest by
far in Korea (below 10 percent). They are consider-
ably above average also in most of the Continental
European countries, and below average in the
English-speaking countries (except Australia) and
Switzerland.The generally higher rates for the entire
population are due to the inclusion of public pensions:
generous earnings-related public pensions are mea-
sured as being very effective at reducing in-equality,in
part because they restore middle-income retirees to
their pre-retirement ranking. Differences in inequali-
ty reduction between the entire and the working-age
population are higher in Continental European and
Nordic countries but also in Iceland and Japan.
Countries that achieve the largest redistribution
through taxes and transfers generally record the low-
est inequality in the distribution of household dis-
posable income, although with considerable varia-
tion across countries. For example, the level of dis-
posable-income inequality in Iceland and Switzer-
land is similar to that in Belgium and the Czech
Republic, even though the impact of the welfare
state is significantly greater in the second two coun-
tries; also, Sweden and Denmark record reductions
in inequality that are nearly twice as large as that of
the United States and achieve a level of disposable-
income inequality that is around half of that record-
ed in the United States.
The effectiveness of benefits and taxes is even
stronger when it comes to poverty reduction:on aver-
age, they lower overall poverty by around 60 percent
and poverty among the working-age population by
around 50 percent.The league table across countries
looks very similar to that of inequality reduction but
there are a few changes in ranks:Iceland,Ireland,the
United Kingdom but also Norway perform better in
terms of poverty reduction, while Australia, Canada,
Japan but also Germany and Italy perform worse.
OECD (2008) also compares the size of the redistri-
bution achieved by each of the two levers separate-
ly: income taxes and cash transfers. Using a simple
“adding-in” approach based on grouped data, it is
found that the redistribution achieved by public cash
transfers on average is twice as large as that achieved
through household taxes, with one notable excep-
tion. The United States stands out for achieving
greater redistribution through the tax system than
through cash transfers. Japan and Korea also stand
out for the very low redistribution achieved through
the tax system.
It is also possible to look at the different effects of
public cash transfers and household taxes on the
lowest income groups.Table 3 provides a measure of
the redistribution towards people in the lowest
income quintile, separately for gross public transfers
(left-hand panel) and household taxes (right-hand
panel).In a first step,the size of spending (column A
in Table 2 above) is multiplied by the share which
goes to the poorest 20 percent of the population
(column A in Table 3), to calculate gross benefits
accruing to people at the lower end of the distribu-
tion (divided by 100,column B in Table 3).The same
procedure is used to calculate how much tax is paid
by people at the lower end of the distribution, while
the difference between the two values (in the fifth
and last column of Table 3) represents the “net”cash
transfers to the lowest income quintile (expressed as
a percentage of household disposable income).
There are large differences in the overall size of the
redistribution towards low income households as
calculated by this indicator: this ranges from values
(as percentages of household disposable income)
above 5.5 in Australia, Belgium, Denmark and
Sweden, to values of around 2 in Japan, Poland and
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A. Inequality reduction effect in %
DIFFERENCES IN INEQUALITY AND POVERTY BEFORE AND 
AFTER TAXES AND TRANSFERS IN OECD COUNTRIES
mid-2000s




























Note: Countries are ranked in increasing order of the percentage reduction in 
inequality and poverty of the entire population. Inequality is defined in terms of the 
Gini coefficient of concentration of income, poverty is defined in terms of the 
relative income poverty rate, i.e., the percentage of persons in households with less 
than half the median disposable income in their country.
B.Poverty reduction effect in %
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the United States, and to less than 0.5 in Korea.
There are also large differences in the mix of cash
transfers and household taxes used to redistribute
income towards people at the bottom of the income
scale. For example, the value of the public transfers
to people in the lowest quintile (column B) is
30 times that of the household taxes they pay
column D) in Australia and Ireland, and more than
ten times in the United Kingdom, as compared to
levels of only twice (or less) for Korea and Poland.
Nordic countries transfer large amounts of gross
benefits to low-income people but also levy a signif-
icant amount of household taxes on them; converse-
ly, most English-speaking countries pay less gener-
ous transfers but offset this partly by levying lower
household taxes on them.Finally,countries redistrib-
ute income towards people at the bottom of the
income scale through different
combinations of the size and pro-
gressivity of their taxes and trans-
fers. For example, Australia and
Norway pay comparable amounts
of gross transfers to low-income
people, with a spending effort in
the former country of only two-
thirds that of the latter – the dif-
ference being offset by the far
greater targeting of the transfers
paid in Australia.
When looking at changes over the
past decade in the size of the
redistribution from rich to poor,
such changes differ significantly
across countries but are small on
average. The reduction of income
inequality achieved by the com-
bined effect of household taxes
and public cash transfers declined
over the past decade in around
half of the countries (Table 4).
These developments were mainly
driven by changes in the redistrib-
ution achieved by public cash
transfers (which declined in most
countries), which was only partly
offset by stronger redistribution
through household taxes.Net pub-
lic transfers also have weaker
effects in reducing poverty today
than in the past in three Nordic
countries as well as in Canada
and New Zealand. These changes
in redistribution may however reflect changes in mar-
ket-income inequality, which tends to increase the
redistributive effects for a given structure of tax and
benefit systems.
Limits of the standard approach
The standard approach upon which the above esti-
mates are based has important limits:first,it assumes
7 Layard (1977), for example, argues that the standard approach
exaggerates the redistributive impact of the welfare state because
it assumes that the different levels of welfare state spending and
taxation have no behavioural impact on the distribution of market
incomes. Bergh (2005) illustrates this problem with a theoretical
model which takes account of behavioural changes.In a recent con-
tribution, Esping-Andersen and Myles (2009) propose developing
a more comprehensive methodology for empirical simulation mod-
els to overcome the “counterfactual problem”.
Table 3 
Redistribution through cash transfers and household taxes towards people
at the bottom of the income ladder, mid-2000s
Gross public transfers
paid to households

























 (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (D–B) 
Australia 41,5 5,9 0,8 0,2 5,8
Austria 13,9 5,1 5,4 1,8 3,3
Belgium 24,1 7,3 3,9 1,5 5,8
Canada 25,7 3,5 2,3 0,6 2,9
Czech Republic 23,0 5,6 3,5 0,8 4,8
Denmark 36,0 9,2 6,1 3,2 6,0
Finland 32,9 4,7 4,0 1,2 3,5
France 16,2 5,3 5,6 1,5 3,9
Germany 17,4 4,9 2,1 0,7 4,2
Iceland 22,3 4,3 – – –
Ireland 30,8 5,4 0,9 0,2 5,3
Italy 12,6 3,7 1,8 0,6 3,1
Japan 15,9 3,1 6,0 1,2 2,0
Korea 25,0 0,8 5,8 0,5 0,4
Luxembourg 13,9 4,3 5,9 1,4 2,8
Netherlands 31,5 5,4 3,4 0,8 4,5
New Zealand 34,0 4,4 1,8 0,5 3,9
Norway 27,7 6,0 4,6 1,5 4,5
Poland 9,0 3,2 6,0 1,7 1,6
Portugal 12,8 3,3 2,5 0,7 2,5
Slovakia 19,0 4,9 5,0 1,0 3,9
Sweden 25,9 8,5 6,5 2,8 5,7
Switzerland 29,2 4,7 – – –
United Kingdom 31,4 4,6 1,7 0,4 4,1
United States 24,8 2,3 1,6 0,4 1,9
OECD-23 23,7 4,8 3,8 1,1 3,8
Note: OECD-23 average excludes Iceland and Switzerland.
 Source: OECD (2008).a “counterfactual” world without taxes and transfers
which is unrealistic and difficult to define.7 Second,it
is limited to the cash components but excludes the
in-kind components of public transfers as well as the
impact of indirect taxes.
• Arithmetically, the standard approach assumes
re-ranking of individuals when calculating pre-tax
pre-transfer inequality measures. An alternative
would be to disallow re-ranking, and rank indi-
viduals by their disposable income, i.e., by where
they end up “after” redistribution, rather than
where they were placed “before” redistribution.
On this alternative measure, the reduction of
inequality achieved by taxes and transfers is
somewhat lower (around 26 percent for the entire
population, on OECD average), while the same
group of countries score best (Denmark,Sweden)
and worst (Korea; OECD 2008). There are, how-
ever, considerable changes for some English-
speaking countries.Based on the alternative mea-
sure of redistribution, the combined effect of
transfers and taxes in reducing inequality in New
Zealand and the United Kingdom is at OECD
average, about the level of Luxembourg.And the
redistribution in Australia and Ireland is above-
average, similar to the levels achieved in
Germany and the Netherlands. It follows that
using this measure, the higher levels of dispos-
able-income inequality in these four English-
speaking countries do not reflect less effective
welfare states but higher market-income inequal-
ity, in particular of household earnings, to start
with.
• The benefits of publicly provided in-kind services
for education, health and housing are distributed
more equally than cash incomes, even after taxes
and cash benefits are taking into account. As a
result, inclusion of these in-kind services narrows
income inequality further, on average by nearly a
quarter, and by larger amounts in Australia,
Denmark, France, Norway and Sweden. In the
United States, public services have the same
impact in reducing inequality as do household
taxes and cash transfers. Across countries, the
equalising effect of publicly provided services dif-
fers among programmes – with generally large
reductions due to compulsory education, non-
specialist health care and public housing,and neg-
ligible ones for non-compulsory education
(OECD 2008).
• Indirect taxes (e.g., VAT) are generally less pro-
gressive than direct taxes, and therefore tend to
widen income inequalities, but there are only few
comparative studies of the distributional impact
of consumption taxes (or employer social security
contributions).8
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8 See Warren (2008) for discussion.
Table 4 
Changes in government redistribution in reducing inequality and poverty, mid-1990s to mid-2000s
Reduction of inequality
Due to both taxes and 
public cash transfers
Due to public cash
transfers alone



















































Note: Changes refer to the period from the mid-1990s to around 2000 for Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark
and Ireland.
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Conclusion
Two major objectives of the welfare state are to
redistribute across the lifecycle and to redistribute
between rich and poor.All OECD countries pursue
both objectives,although the emphasis given to each
of them varies significantly between countries.
Overall, several conclusions stand out from this
analysis.
• In general, countries with lower levels of transfer
spending have a more progressive structure of
both benefits and taxes,although there are excep-
tions (Mexico, with low-spending also has very
low progressivity) and other cross-country differ-
ences (e.g., Nordic countries have higher-than-
average spending and progressive benefit struc-
tures, but less progressive tax systems).
• The tax and benefit systems in all OECD coun-
tries reduce income inequality and poverty, with
the impact being greater in the Nordic countries
and lower in the Asian and the English-speaking
countries, together with Switzerland. On average
across OECD countries, inequality is reduced by
around one third among the entire population
and by around a fourth among the working-age
population. Overall poverty is reduced by around
60 percent and working-age poverty is halved.
• The redistributive effect of the welfare state is
generally larger for public cash benefits than for
household taxes – except in the United States,
which achieves more redistribution through the
tax system than through the transfer system.
Japan and Korea also stand out for the very low
redistribution achieved through the tax system.
• During the past decade, the reduction of income
inequality achieved by the combined effect of
household taxes and public cash transfers
declined in around half of OECD countries.
These developments were mainly driven by
changes in the redistribution achieved by public
cash transfers which declined in most countries.
• On an alternative redistribution measure which
ranks individuals by where they end up “after”
redistribution, rather than where they were
placed “before”redistribution,the average reduc-
tion of inequality achieved by taxes and transfers
is somewhat lower (around 26 percent for the
entire population, on OECD average), while
some English-speaking countries score better.
• Publicly provided in-kind services for education,
health and housing reduce overall inequality by
around one-quarter.
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